Ivan Zassoursky on Wed, 22 Dec 1999 15:06:40 +0300 |
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Syndicate: Russian elections, Chechen war and media-political system at work |
A report on Russian elections follows =========this is a long message========= As the votes are counted, the conclusions are drawn. There are no surprises except for the fact that Russian media-political system was able to achieve results so surprisingly predictable. But let me explain. What is media-political system? Media-political system is a way to describe the complex structure of media ownership (who owns what). In Russia political system has been nonexistent. The place of political parties has been taken by a number of media holdings. Their owners work as powerful political brokers and exercise total control over the main TV channels. The structure of Russian media-political system could be described as consisting of three levels. First level is politicized media, i.e. those, who work not for profit but for political influence. Politicized investment has been very important for Russian media in the 90-ies, so it should not surprise you that these 'non-profit media' are numerous. The most important is central TV. Two channels (ORT & RTR) are broadcasted over 99% and 97% of Russian territory. They are both formally controlled by the state, but in reality ORT information programs are under control by Mr. Berezovsky. This media mogul owns also a number of important daily newspapers and weekly magazines + another nationwide TV-network called TV6. The second level of media-political system is comprised of commercial media. They are also to a large degree controlled by political investors. But some of the most important outlets are owned by moguls trying to balance between profits from political influence and commercial advertising (such as Mr. Gusinsky, a Murdoch-styled owner of two TV networks, a whole bunch of channels on satellite TV + a couple of magazines and a daily newspaper). They are not as vicious as the first level guys - they don't sell out at parliamentary elections. They wait for the presidential campaign instead eager to earn a bonus for their patience. The third level is regional media. In regions commercial media are rarely numerous. Most of the TV stations and regional newspapers are controlled by the governors (usually figures of paternalist appeal) or huge companies and other powerful investors capable of keeping local journalist corps afloat. Elections-99 Elections-99 were for the State Duma - lower chamber of Russian parliament, 450 seats to be filled by aspiring politicians. The last Duma was controlled by the communists and their allies (i.e. more than 226 seats). That was a peculiar result of the presidential campaign of 1996, when Boris Yeltsin was reelected. Presidential campaign follows after that of parliament - after 6 months or so. In 1995 the govt then worked hard to promote communists in their successful attempt to marginilize non-communist candidates for presidential campaign - Duma is not nearly as powerful as president in this country. Their plan worked out pretty well - people voted for Boris Yeltsin in the second round of elections in spite of everything, simply because there were no other non-communist politicians to choose from. But that intrigue left a communist majority in Duma. Elections-99 were different but in a way very much like those in 1995. They are also best understood in the contest of presidential campaign (elections are scheduled for this summer). As in 1995-1996 privatized property is at stake - those who win the elections, may distribute the remains of Corporation USSR at will. Yeltsin in 1995-6 and Putin in 1999-2000 stand as a guarantee that oligarchs will not go to jail and will keep what they already own (almost everything). As before, there is a war in Chechnya. But some things are different. Of all the differences the most important one is that in 1999 Yeltsin and oligarchs were confronted not only by dispersed opposition and weak leaders, but also by a powerful Moscow-based clan, headed by Youry Luzhkov (Moscow major) and ex-prime minister Evgeny Primakov (candidate for presidency). This clan was represented in the elections by the political party Fatherland-All Russia (FAR). It was regarded as a favorite for parliamentary race, because it was built with support from local governors (+ regional press and TV of course) and had a couple of media holdings to support them (for example Gusinsky worked for them). The strategy The strategy of presidential administration and Putin during the parliamentary campaign was thus almost the same as that employed four years ago. Information war on their main enemies + publicity for weak opposition parties to discredit Primakov and marginalize FAR. A new political movement Unity was constructed three months before the elections using the same model as FAR (making some FAR-supporting governors even changed their minds) and the central TV endorsed it, launching a Soviet-style all-out attack on FAR leaders. Among those supported to marginalize FAR were Unity, The Right Forces Union (RFU), Zhirinovsky as usual and - to a much greater degree then 4 years ago, but for the same reason - communists. Poor scapegoats are once again pushed to continue their hopeless struggle. The results come with no surprise - they mirror almost exactly the map of media ownership (corrected according to the PR strategy employed). Communists, Unity, FAR, Zhirinovsky, The Right Forces Union and Yabloko passed into the Duma. The idea is that two fractions (Unity and RFU) will endorse Putin as their candidate. Basically this is why their campaigns were paid for - to stage a growing cross-party support for Putin, preparing him for the landslide victory next year. But destroying other candidates and promoting communists is not enough to get anybody elected. You have to find a positive issue, at least a single reason why this or that candidate is ok. The Chechen war Nobody knows who blew up all those buildings and why some of the Chechen rebels invaded Dagestan. But as a result this war started in a totally different fashion then the first one in 1994. Who could guess that oil prices would take off as a rocket (letting Putin run as the economics wizard), so there was no other issue except for war if Putin was to run. And war is the ultimate pseudo-event. Press-conferences, pop-conserts and other gatherings, political scandals etc. - all these features of political spectacle can be ignored. Except for war. War is the ultimate feature of political spectacle, one of those methods of persuasion of last resort. No matter what are the reasons for war, it is impossible to ignore it. You are drawn into the spectacle, and once you are politicized you can be manipulated to support the patriotic consensus emerging here - and vote for Putin. Putin is Chechen war and nothing else. Almost everybody I know among political consultants is already hired to work for him in the next couple of months. Their job will be to prepare enough 'events' for future media coverage of this wartime hero. This probably explains why this war receives such a different coverage here and in the West. Here it is an election issue supported by the most important media-holdings in Russian media-political system. To win Putin needs a definite 'solution' in Chechnya and nothing else. All the extra incomes from growing oil prices allow this war to drag as long as needed - at least until some kind of 'victory' can be proclaimed. So far this war has been regarded as successful revenge here, but if things go wrong some kind of face-saving formula could be invented during some kind of negotiations, and peace treaty could be signed before the second round of presidential elections. At least that will be the case if Putin stays as popular as he is now, when nobody really knows a thing about him (he sports astonishing 48% of potential votes). But the funniest thing is that Yeltsin can always change his mind and destroy Putin as easily as he was once created, replacing him with somebody else instead - and things could work out somehow anyway. As the example of pro-govt Unity movement (built from scratch, 23% of votes) has shown, existing media-political system and PR-technologies allow to establish a brand so quickly these days - almost at the speed of broadcast. 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