Re: <nettime> The German "Open Letter" on Ukraine

Hi everyone,

Olaf Scholz' term "Zeitenwende" (turn of an era) has been picked up a lot in the German debate and it is probably true as well for the radical left

which since 1989 was focussed on 2 developments: opposition to "re-unified" Germany and the development of the Green Party. During the 90's

the process of dissolving the pacifist consensus was obvious within the Greens which was seen as a way to get ready to join the government.

After the election in the fall of 1998 this proved to be true very soon with NATO's bombing of Serbia because of Kosovo. This was the time of Joschka Fischers

infamous statement about the lessons from WW2 (instead of "Nie wieder Faschismus, nie wieder Krieg!" - never again fascism or war - he

said: "Nie wieder Auschwitz!" - never again Auschwitz - insinuating that in Kosovo industrial mass-murder needed to be stopped by military force).

Too often the Marx' quote about the repetition of history seems to make sense: as soon as Merkel (who had stayed in power as long as Kohl) was gone

and a "progressive government" was formed, Germany was involved in a war again... But this time things are quite different: what we have seen

during the Merkel years with the rise of the AfD is the development of a German version of "right-wing populism" which managed to usurp quite a few

former leftist positions: on the forefront the pacifist agenda. Actually, the founding of this party in 2013 was followed quite shortly afterwards by

the rise of two different social movements: Pegida in Dresden on the one hand (demonstrations against "Islamization of Europe") and

so-called "peace winter" which was a reaction to the annexation of Crimea. Although many more or less prominent members of the party Die Linke

took part in these demonstrations, it became soon clear that this was dominated by a strange mix of right-wing people with inclination for

conspiracy tales. The word "Putin-Versteher" (someone who is inclined to "understand" Putin's policy in the sense of offering excuses for it -

a very dumb, but unfortunately wide-spread term which was coined after the sexist term of "Frauenversteher" which ridicules men who "understand" women,

that is feminist positions). The "peace winter" of 2014 was already an erosion of the pacifist agenda. The preparation for what we see now.

What leftists in Germany had to face is the fact that there is a tradition of right-wing "Russia understanding". And a wide-spread fear of German and Russian

complicity in Eastern Europe. The irony of history is that this year we are not only witnessing the 100th birthday of the founding of the USSR, but also

of "Rapallo", the treaty between the Weimar Republic and the young Soviet Union for cooperation (including secret military training).

Now we had to learn that since then a "Rapallo-complex" exists in all countries between Germany and Russia: Middle and Eastern Europe

including those countries which Timothy Snyder called "The Bloodlands" (Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine). It is worth reading Hannah Arendt's book on totalitarianism again in which she describes the rise of the two "pan-movements": pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic.

While there is a lot of talk about "Russio-phobia" these days, the question is, if we also have to talk about a specific German "Russio-philia"?

Which brings us back to the 100th birthday of the USSR: We have to acknowledge that for quite some time now the Soviet Union has been "Russified".

The Red Army is seen as a Russian Army, the Soviet victory over Nazi-Germany as Russian victory - and the Soviet Union as such as as a greater red Russia.

One of the interventions of Ukrainian activists is to insist that this is a falsification of history. And accordingly the narrative in Ukraine has shifted:

while after EuroMaidan the main reference of "history politics" were Ukrainian nationalists, now the Selensky government is trying to turn Putins

propaganda against him: Ukraine is also fighting a "Great patriotic war".

But as far as Ukrainian leftit activists are concerned, there is one thing even more important than the fight against the falsification of Soviet history:

"No f*cking westplaining!" Very soon after the escalation of Russia's war open letters to the Western left were published - recently again:

https://lefteast.org/us-plaining-is-not-enough-to-the-western-left-on-your-and-our-mistakes/

Is there a specific German form of "westplaining"? I am afraid, yes. A rather notorious one. And it has to do with the history of the German left since 1989,

especially with the attack on Kosovo in 1999. This was already a "turn of era", since it was the first participation in military action for Germany since 1945.

The opposition against this development has led to a very special strand in the leftist spectrum which became known as "anti-German".

One of the main protagonists was a man called Jürgen Elsässer. He was a rather prominent publicist - for a while the chief editor of the former

East German youth newspaper "Junge Welt" and a contributor of the influential monthly magazine KONKRET.

Elsässer is a key-figure since he changed from "anti-German" to neo-nazi and is now one of the main protagonist of the New Right.

He founded his own monthly glossy magazine which is called COMPACT.

How could this happen? At a certain point Elsässer exercised self-criticism and stated that he was wrong: No longer did he believe that there was

a specific danger of German neo-imperialism, but of a broader Western neo-imperialism. Already in 2009 he expressed sympathy for

Ahmadinejad in Iran etc. And against this Western threat he discovered a new peace-alliance: only Russia and Germany united could stop the

warmongering of the US and its allies. Which brings us back to the tradition of German "Russia-philia" which was strong during the 1920's

in the circles of the so-called "Conservative Revolution" (Moeller van den Bruck etc.) It is exactly this milieu that the so-called "New Right" wants

to reactivate for many years now (Götz Kubitschek etc.)

Now is this only a fringe phenomenon? I am not so sure. I am afraid that the Open Letter proves that there is a certain potential for linking this

sentiment with mainstream currents. The tricky thing is that it is mixed with more or less authentic yearning for peace, for reconciliation between

Germans and Russians etc. But as Felix wrote: for many years this mainly social democratic "Wandel durch Handel" policy was nothing but a

fig leave for very material interests. We now have to acknowledge that "understanding Putin" was not only a speciality of Sarah Wagenknecht

and other backward minded members of the party Die Linke, but quite a large consensus in German society which also served quite powerful

economic interests. It was after all not only Gregor Gysi who expressed his dismay that with Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine many of his

political beliefs were shattered, but also the notorious liberal Wolfgang Kubicki. And if these two men discover that they have something in common,

then one should consider if there is a specific "German ideology" in effect here...

To finish: The main message of Ukrainian leftists to the German left is to face the reality of economic complicity between the elites of Germany and Russia.

Schröder is only the tip of the iceberg. The filmmaker Oleksyi Radynski has researched what has been called the "deal of the century" for quite some time

now: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/107/322782/is-data-the-new-gas/

Soon after the war he had published "The case against the Russian Federation" on eflux (a translation was published by taz):

https://www.e-flux.com/journal/125/453868/the-case-against-the-russian-federation/

In this context he also speaks of Putinism as a variation of what Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Collective has called "fossil fascism" (while Malm&Co.

do not consider the case of the Russian Federation at all). You can see his statement here at a talk that I organize irregularly at Roter Salon at

Volksbühne am Rosa Luxemburg Platz in Berlin: https://www.volksbuehne.berlin/#/de/veranstaltungen/diskussionsveranstaltung-ukraine-4

Let me finish by saying that this series was inspired by the open letters by Ukrainian leftists like Volodymyr Artiukh or Taras Bilous and others.

We tried to refrain from "westplaining" and to start to listen. Not only to those who are directly affected by Russia's war of aggression, but also by

the voices from Middle and Eastern Europe which were not heard enough. They have been warning about Nord Stream 2 for example.

But there was no reaction. No "block the pipeline" action etc.

What to do now? Well, there is a tradition on the left to support the delivery of arms (which seems to be forgotten by many): "Weapons for El Salvador!"

for example. Or recently for Rojava. If one does not want to go so far - that's fine. But then the question is: what else? Is there an alternative to be

in solidarity with the people in Ukraine - and not to be called a "couch pacifist"? The only alternative I see is to support the call for an energy embargo.

To denounce the "deal of the century" as a complicity of fossil fascists. And to put the war in a broader context of a decolonial perspective which needs to

include the case of the Russian federation. But also the way that Eastern Europe was treated by Germany as well (for example how Kohl supported Gorbatchev).

And a radical ecological activism to end the era of extractivism now. This is the "turn of an era" the world needs.

Thanks for reading. Alex

Am Mi., 18. Mai 2022 um 08:22 Uhr schrieb Michael Goldhaber <michael@goldhaber.org>:

“A ceasefire as soon as possible, A compromise both sides can accept”

Brian and everyone,

The German open letter offers the simple solution to the Ukraine crisis of “A ceasefire as soon as possible, A compromise both sides can accept,” as if the road to this were somehow easy to see and likely to occur anytime soon. Though I consider myself a pacifist, I wonder what events in the recent histories of wars makes this goal seem even remotely realistic.

Wars end in the following conditions:

When one side clearly has won and the other sides is utterly depleted, as in (to mention only wars in the past century or so) World Wars I and II or the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars or the Viet-Nam war (where the anti-draft and anti-war movement in the US helped produce the realization of effective depletion) or either the Soviets or Americans in Afghanistan or the Sinhalese defeat of Tamils in Sri Lanka;

When a fairly long-term stalemate has occurred, as in the Korean War, which was left pretty much in status quo ante, and in several long wars in Africa or the 50-year civil war in Colombia;

When the war has been pretty much a border skirmish and each side understands it is not in its own interest to allow the war to widen, as in various short conflicts between India and either China or Pakistan;

When dominant outside powers force the much weaker war participants to accept a peace, as in the 1956 Sinai War or the Bosnian war;

When real war could easily occur but the two sides realize clearly that it must be avoided, as in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Only in case 5 has diplomacy been effective in ending things; in the other cases actual belligerence or restraint or threats of stronger outside-power intervention, more than diplomacy of any sort, actually determined the outcome. Diplomacy has come to the fore after the wars, for instance in peace congresses organized among the victors, not during the wars and not even usually to end them.

The US and EU could decide to stop helping Ukraine, in which case it would probably eventually and painfully lose to Russia, but why should we believe that even that degree of pressure on Ukraine would enable it to make any kind of reasonable peace with Russia? It seems pretty clear to me that Ukrainians would and should feel horribly abandoned if that happens , but that they would still fight on a long time, even if hopelessly. That path would increase the likelihood of further war in Eastern Europe or elsewhere.

As for putting pressure on Russia, that’s what the US and EU are trying to do with sanctions and arming Ukraine, but unless Putin has a change of heart, we can’t expect that to lead to peace soon.

In neither case is diplomacy likely to help much since the history of Russia, probably for centuries, is of type 1 almost exclusively. There have been no peace talks that amounted to anything in Syria or in Chechnya, or in WWII. The surrender by Lenin to Germany and Austria in WWI was because the revolution couldn’t succeed while fighting on in what was anyway a losing cause.

Unless some new form of pressure for peace is invented, the only hope for any reasonable end to the fighting is if Russians somehow turn against Putin or if he can find some way to come out heroically while withdrawing. Otherwise he will continue what may be a losing battle while still inflicting great damage on Ukraine.

Calling for diplomacy is easy to do but, sadly, highly unrealistic.

Best,
Michael

On May 17, 2022, at 8:50 AM, Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldrift@gmail.com> wrote:

Below is a machine translation of the “Open Letter” to Scholz, signed by over 200,000 German personalities including Alice Schwartzer, Alexander Kluge and Siegfried Zielinski. The source is here:

https://www.emma.de/artikel/offener-brief-bundeskanzler-scholz-339463

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